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A New Direction for Whistleblower Protections

Welcome, link to a MS Word version of this document.

Protecting Whistleblowers By Guaranteeing Their Income To Retirement

Prepared By
Thomas F. Day
PO Box 16495
Washington DC  20041
tfday@aol.com 

October 31, 2006

Executive Summary:

This proposal recommends separating the protections afforded to whistleblowers into those provided through the Executive Branch and those provide by the Legislative Branch. The protections that currently exist primarily within the personnel system are defined as the protections afforded by the Executive Branch. While the current protections are indicative of a required level of management practices, this proposal contends that any changes to the Executive Branch protections should be driven by that branch’s goals and objectives. Therefore, this proposal remains neutral with regard to Executive Branch protections.

Instead, this proposal recommends the establishment of a program of whistleblower protections that would be provided and administered by the Legislative Branch in a manner consistent the separation of powers between the branches of government while operating well within the scope of Congressional oversight. The program would be implemented through the establishment of the Office of the Advocate General (OAG) as an office within the General Accountability Office (GAO) placing the administration and investigation of the allegations within the Legislative Branch. The OAG would be tasked to receive all allegations of improprieties, would be granted the authority to investigate all disclosures, have the capability to make the determination of the actual or assessed value of the disclosure, and would be designated as the administering office for the payment of the income guarantee.

The key difference between the current system that attempts to protect the whistleblower’s job and this approach is that this proposal recommends protecting whistleblowers from financial retaliation by guaranteeing their income to full retirement. Unlike the current system that provided protections for the merely reporting what is believed to be an impropriety, under this system of protections the allegations must be substantiated with the amount of the income guarantee based on the actual or assessed value of their disclosure. Another key difference is that this proposal would permit either the whistleblower or the whistleblower’s management chain to terminate the whistleblower’s federal service.

The remainder of this document sets forth the rational and justification for implementing this proposal.

Focus Is On Government Efficiency:

It is my observation that the act of reporting a difference of opinion of any kind is a regular occurrence in the normal workplace. It is also a normal occurrence that most managers will take the steps necessary to correct the problem once they become aware that a problem exists. The act of whistleblowing obtains a level of notoriety and becomes the abnormality when management is made aware of the problem, does not take corrective action, persists in a manner of perceived wrongdoing, attempts to cover-up their improprieties, and/or takes retaliatory actions against the whistleblower through what they justify as a legitimate personnel action such as a demotion, change of duties, termination from federal service or some other prohibited personnel action or inaction.

How do you feel about granting a life-time income to someone who reports some form of waste, fraud, or abuse? More importantly, contemplate what you think would be the response to the same question if you were asking the person who has committed some form of waste, fraud, or abuse? Imagine their reaction if the person who disclosed their impropriety has been granted a life-time income protection. I would submit to you that if the person who has perpetrated the act of wrongdoing was not able to retaliate against the whistleblower, that their whole view of being able to get away with the wrongdoing in the first place will be altered to the extent that there will be a significant decrease in the number of discoverable incidents.

Therefore, the goal of this proposal is not a stream of early retirements, but a far more efficient federal government where it would be a common occurrence for managers to ask if anyone had a better solution or any concerns about the issue at hand. While there are those who believe that this is already a common occurrence, the real difference comes from the willingness of those present to answer the question. Currently and even with the most efficiently motivated senior manager, there are those who will remain silent because to speak up could be the end of their career. Under this proposal, the person who speaks up could well be establishing their right to an early retirement with pay.

The Need For A New Paradigm:

When I became a whistleblower back in 1989, I joined with others and worked for the enactment of what in draft form was supposed to have been the end-all-to-end-all of whistleblower protections. While Congress adopted many of the ideas put forth in the Whistleblower Protect Act of 1994, there were ideas that were left lying on the floor. That is the reality of legislative change and it was true then, it is true now, and it will be true for whatever legislation is proposed in the future. Nevertheless, there has been an annual progression of legislation designed to plug one loop-hole after another in the laws that supposedly make retaliation against a whistleblower more and more illegal. Again this year, there has been s a rush to push another band-aid through Congress to correct a Supreme Court ruling that essentially crushed the ability of a whistleblower to make a disclosure without the loss of his job.

What is the behavioral description of doing the same thing again and again with the expectation of getting a different result? Insanity. Now, if we approach the problem from the direction of guaranteeing the income to retirement for the whistleblower does this represent a paradigm shift, and could it be accomplished in a manner that is consistent with the scope and purpose of Congressional oversight?

I see little evidence to suggest that the present system has done much at all to stimulate managers to act more prudently. There is nothing to suggest that a whistleblower can rely on the laws, rules and regulations such that they could or should feel that they are protected from the inevitable retaliation. To their credit and despite many setbacks, hundreds of federal employees step forward each year to disclose violations of laws, rule, regulations, etc. only to find themselves in the headlines because they’ve been fired.

There are those moments when the plight of a particular whistleblower is seized upon by well-meaning Members of Congress who show their concern through hearing after hearing, but historically these hearings have done little to repair the damage done to the career of the whistleblower. Therefore, it is impossible to reach any conclusion other than the current efforts to protect the whistleblower’s job are counter productive for everyone.

Maintaining a Separation of Powers:

The Constitutional issue of the separation of powers has entered the fray whereby the Judicial Branch has held that the Legislative Branch has improperly attempted to mandate the management practices of the Executive Branch as they pertain to the protections afforded to whistleblowers. To me, it is not surprising that the Judicial Branch has ruled along the side of the Executive Branch on key decisions that have weakened or negated the current process of protections. That does not mean that the cases brought before the Judiciary are without merit, but that the Judiciary is very much against the idea of public criticism of its own personnel or processes as noted in the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos.

Nevertheless, I do believe that it is within the scope of Congressional oversight to provide for the protections of persons who report authenticated allegations. Essentially, I have concluded that the most effective protection would be for the Legislative Branch to guarantee the whistleblower’s income to retirement instead of imposing more laws, rules, and regulations on the Executive Branch to protect the whistleblowers job or their right to fight for reinstatement that will only end up in another courtroom battle between the branches of government.

Obviously, the Members of Congress who have been entrusted to enact the legislation to provide these protections to whistleblowers believe that perpetrators of waste, fraud, abuse, etc., are simply going to become well behaved individuals and that whistleblowers are not going to experience retaliation just because Congress said it was not to happen. But, what has Congress really done?

The Congressional Vision of Protections:

With the help and support of many well-meaning persons from many well known and respected organizations since the early 1990’s, Congress has repeatedly considered and enacted laws that make retaliation illegal. Congress has even opened the door to the courtroom so that a whistleblower who believes that they have suffered the loss of their job (the usual act of retaliation) can be reinstated and compensated with back pay and attorney fees. Take a moment to think about what that really means to the whistleblower.

It means that a person in management can use all the tools and resources of the federal government to create a reasonable and justifiable letter of termination for the whistleblower (denying of course that there was any relation to the whistleblower’s disclosure) thereby ending the whistleblower’s career. By law, Congress has given the whistleblower the right to spend tens of thousands of dollars in legal fees in order to file suit in federal court to seek the privilege of being reinstated into a job. Again, Congress has been beneficial in granting the awarding of attorney fees if the whistleblower prevails, but this is only relief that comes after the fact and most whistleblowers run out of cash long before they even get to court.

The court process is not a quick one. It will be years before the whistleblower gets their day in court and years more to contend with the appeals that are likely to follow.

Meanwhile, the whistleblower has a family to feed so they are out looking for another job that will allow them time-off the job to meet with lawyers, time-off to give and take depositions, and time-off to go to court. Again, all of this is to earn the right to be reinstated into another job, or maybe you are thinking that the whistleblower can just collect back pay and keep the current job.

In other words, even if the retaliation is genuine, the more realistic conclusion of events is that the whistleblower will lose their job, and receive some pittance of a settlement that is not likely to cover the legal fees. Meanwhile, the person who has inflicted the retaliation goes unpunished. Mr. Congressman, that is what your vision of protections has provided to the typical whistleblower.

The Lop-sided “Justice” of the Judiciary:

If one relies on the present system, one might insist that the judicial process is still open to the whistleblower and you would concur with the Department of Justice that has expressed the view that current law offers substantial protection. You would think that if it was against the law to retaliate against a whistleblower that there would be a penalty for doing so. You would also think that there would be a trail of court decisions supporting the whistleblower. Let me quote from a letter written on September 20, 2006, by the Honorable Members of Congress, Mr. Tom Davis, Chairman of the House Committee on Government Reform; and Mr. Todd Platts, the sponsor of H.R. 1317:

“Our main concern with the Justice opinion is that they assert current law offers “substantial protection.” This conclusion has no support in the record. Since 1994, when Congress strengthened the Whistleblower Protection Act, the track record is 1-122 against whistleblowers for final decisions on the merits by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

With that history, what change do you anticipate from the proposed language that was in the Defense Authorizations Bill? It is my opinion that even with the new legislation, there are many well meaning and well deserving federal employees who will suffer the consequences of financial retaliation.

Defining Whistleblowing:

I think it is appropriate to define whistleblowing as it is described in S. 494RS from the 1st Session of the 109th Congress which is a modification to Section 2302(b)(8) of title 5 of the United States Code. In this case, I am providing the law as it exists with the changes from S. 494RS as either stricken text or as italic for the new content. The remaining twenty-pages of S.494 may be viewed or downloaded from http://thomas.loc.gov/ and the full text of Title 5 is also online.

…Any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences without restriction to time, place, form, motive, context, or prior disclosure made to any person by an employee or applicant, including a disclosure made in the ordinary course of an employee’s duties, that the employee or applicant reasonably believes is evidence of - a violation any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs; or any disclosure to the Special Counsel, or to the Inspector General of an agency or another employee designated by the head of the agency to receive such disclosures, of information which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences without restriction to time, place, form, motive, context, or prior disclosure made to any person by an employee or applicant, including a disclosure made in the ordinary course of an employee’s duties, that the employee or applicant reasonably believes is evidence of - a violation any violation (other than a violation of this section) of any law, rule, or regulation, or gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; or any disclosure that is made by an employee or applicant of information required by law or Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs that the employee or applicant reasonably believes is direct and specific evidence of – any violation of any law, rule, or regulation; gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; or a false statement to Congress on an issue of material fact; and is made to – a member of a committee of Congress having a primary responsibility for oversight of a department, agency, or element of the Federal Government to which the disclosed information relates and who is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed; any other Member of Congress who is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed; or an employee of Congress who has the appropriate security clearance and is authorized to receive information of the type disclosed.

A Simplified Example of Financial Waste:

Now that you have the definition, let me provide an example of what might constitute a disclosure in a case of gross waste. By the way, any similarity of this example to an actual set of circumstances is purely coincidental. For discussion, let's assume that you are a federal employee and that you are mid-level manager earning $90,000 per year with ten years to go before you are eligible for full retirement benefits. You and most of your fellow workers are excited to learn that your Agency is buying laptop computers for all 10,000 of its employees. Since you had just been out shopping for a laptop for your college-bound son or daughter, you know that a nice laptop is going to cost about $1,500.

As you learn more about the Agency's plans, you are shocked to learn that your agency is buying the same commercial, off-the-shelf laptop you had been looking at, but that they are going to be paying $6,000 for each one. In other words, the Agency is going to be spending a total of sixty-million dollars ($60,000,000) when with a little practical shopping they could get the same thing for fifteen-million dollars ($15,000,000). You've seen the notice on the hallway bulletin board advertising that your Agency has a Beneficial Suggestion Program that will award you ten-percent of the savings for any suggestion that saves the Agency money. So you make the suggestion to the proper authorities that the Agency procure the laptops from the XYZ Computer Store at a savings of $45,000,000. You've done the math and you can't wait to get home to tell the wife that you are going to get a $4,500,000 bonus.

The next morning you arrive at the office and are greeted with an email notice that the deal had already been done and there would not be a bonus check since there would not be any savings after all. Seems like the right place to quit and go about your job, but the idea that your Agency wasted $45,000,000 irritates you. After all, you are a taxpayer and you don't think it is right to waste the taxpayer's money this way. You decide to visit your Agency's Office of the Inspector General and you tell them what you know. They agree that it certainly does seem like there has been some wasteful spending. You are told they will investigate the matter further. They also tell you to contact the Office of Special the Counsel to report your allegations which you do.

Up to this point you haven't gotten anything for your troubles and there has been no harassment or retaliation from anyone. You had reason to believe that there had been an instance of gross waste and you acted on those suspicions by reporting your allegations to the proper authorities. You have become a whistleblower.

Guaranteeing the Whistleblower’s Income to Retirement:

This is an important point in the process of become a whistleblower. It is the point where the allegations have been reported, but it is also the point where the employee has not experienced any of the numerous forms of retaliation that typically follow this type of situation. It is at this point that I assert it is best to provide the protection of guaranteeing your income to full retirement based on the value of your allegations.

Verifiable Allegations:

A key element of this proposed method of protecting whistleblowers is that their allegations must be substantiated to be eligible for the income guarantee. In the past, whistleblower protections have been extended to a person who makes a disclosure of what they believe to be a valid accusation even if the allegation was later shown to be inaccurate. While there are good arguments for maintaining this form of protection within a system of Executive Branch protections, it really has no place in the Congressional oversight protections contained in this proposal. At the same time, there will be instances where the actual value is easily determined; but there will also be instances where there will be a need to develop an assessed value similar to the process of cost benefit analysis. For the example at hand, we will assume that the entire amount of the $45,000,000 can be shown to have been wasteful spending.

Percent Of Savings Attributed To Income Guarantee:

What percentage of the savings should be use to guarantee the whistleblower's income? In our example, the value of the potential savings is established as $45,000,000. If this amount is confirmed, as valid savings, how much of it should be given to the whistleblower in the form of an income guarantee? Once again, the goal of this proposal is to promote the efficiency of government spending and in this regard, the proposed rate is a maximum of fifty percent of the validated savings. Of course, a smaller percentage could be used, but this would only serve to continue the status quo with millions of dollars of inefficient spending.

It is also very important to note that the amount of the proposed income guarantee is not fifty-percent of the savings, but a maximum of fifty-percent of the savings or the projected income of the whistleblower to full retirement whichever is the lesser. For purposes of discussion, I have defined full-retirement as age sixty-six or twenty-years of service whichever occurs last. I think this provision is necessary to adequately protect individuals who become federal employees early in their career so that their income is protected to age sixty-six and to protect people who enter federal service later in life so that their retirement can be guaranteed at the level of a twenty-year career regardless of the age they enter federal service.

From our example, we also know that the whistleblower is currently earning $90,000 per year and has ten years of service remaining before they are eligible for full retirement.  This calculates to a total income guarantee requirement of $900,000 paid out as approximately $3,462.00 every two weeks just as though it was a payroll check to age sixty-six when the person reaches the age for full retirement. In this case, it can be easily determined that the required amount of the income guarantee is less than a million dollars and far below fifty percent of the total savings. That could result in $44,100,000 in realized savings, but it is more realistic that the $44,100,000 would be spent on other pressing needs of the government.

Sample Calculations of Savings and Income Guarantee Payout:

Under the presumption that management will continue to find some reason to justify the removal of the whistleblower for some cause other than the reporting of the allegations, and because I believe this practice will continue regardless of the law in place; it is presumed that individuals are not likely to report frivolous allegations or small dollar savings. Much to the contrary, it is expected that allegations will be for substantial savings and will be well documented (presuming assistance from the Office of the Advocate General in the collection and preparation of documentation). Because of the likelihood of larger alleged savings, and better documentation, it is anticipated that the actual savings will be far more than the minimum of fifty-percent.

The hypothetical data in Table #1 provides some sample calculations for what might be provided to the whistleblower as an income guarantee and what might be returned to the government via the Office of the Advocate General. As you can see from these calculations, allegations of small dollar values will not produce an income guarantee sufficient to last until the person would retire. You can also see that as the dollar value of the alleged savings increases, the whistleblower’s income guarantee is sufficient to last to retirement, and the actual dollars returned to the government and the percentage of savings to the government increase dramatically.

Income Guarantee Not Paid for Continued Federal Employment:

It is the intent of this recommendation that the income guarantee be paid over and above the income that the whistleblower might obtain from other, non-federal service, employment. One point to note is that if the whistleblower decides to remain in federal service, the income guarantee would not be paid over and above the person’s salary. It is true that this proposed method of protecting whistleblowers does create the incentive for the whistleblower to leave federal service, but they would be leaving with essentially full pay and full benefits. However, one option to consider is that if they do remain in federal service, then the amount of the income guarantee might be increased with future grade, step, or annual escalation increases in the person’s base pay.

If the person does elect to terminate federal service, the amount of the income guarantee should be fixed at the time of the election of the guarantee and should not subject to grade, step, or annual escalation. It would be presumed that the typical person would seek alternate employment which would be the appropriate course of action for the person’s future pay increases.

No Required Notification of Management:

Earlier I indicated that one desirable outcome would be for senior management to ask if anyone had any issues or concerns about a particular issue with the intent that persons could and would speak out if the felt there was a better solution. It might be concluded that the process should include some form of required notification to management that the problem exists. However, this might unnecessarily place the whistleblower in a precarious position of soliciting retaliation and I could not support such a requirement.

I believe that it is best to proceed on the basis that the perpetrator knew or should have known that the alleged action constituted a discloseable act. If the resulting investigation determines that management was not aware of all the facts, this might be a mitigating justification for the agency, but it should not be a factor that limits or diminishes the whistleblowers income guarantee.

Since it is still possible for a person to make a disclosure that turns out to be inaccurate, the identity of the whistleblower must be protected to the maximum extent possible in all cases. Obviously, if the whistleblower is mistaken and their allegations cannot be substantiated, the disclosure of the identity of the whistleblower could lead to retaliation (although it would be called something else) and the undesired termination of the whistleblower from federal service. On the other hand, if the whistleblower’s allegations are sustained, it should be the whistleblower who determines whether or not their identity should become known and whether or not continued federal service is desirable.

Assessed Against the Offending Agency:

Just as one more point of clarification, I propose that the income guarantee be paid by the agency that has allegedly committed the qualifying act which may not necessarily be the agency that employed the whistleblower. In most cases, this would be one and the same, but it needs to be clearly understood that the funding of the income guarantee is not necessarily paid by the employing agency.

Does Not Affect Qui Tam Cases:

From time to time, the actions of one particular whistleblower or another contribute to sensational headlines and there is a public perception that whistleblowers are rewarded for their actions. There are times when a whistleblower is awarded mega-millions of dollars for some disclosure, but these are the results of qui tam cases where a whistleblower is recovering funds from a federal contractor on behalf of the federal government. This proposal does not alter the opportunity for a person to bring forth a qui tam action as the means to recover wasted or fraudulent spending.

What Makes More Sense:

Okay, under this proposed plan, Congress gets back $44,100,000 immediately, the whistleblower gets $3,462.00 every two weeks until age sixty-six and normal retirement benefits thereafter. On the other hand, the current system of protections will permit management to terminate the whistleblower for any plausible reason, gives the whistleblower the right to spend tens of thousands of dollars to litigate to get their job back. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has recently demonstrated this is a battle that can last years and can end up being a lost cause. Now, which of these two processes do you thing meets the same “Fair and Reasonable” standard as that imposed on the Federal Acquisitions process? Is this a fair and reasonable standard to apply to anyone who has provided verifiable documentation to support allegations of waste, fraud, or abuse within the federal government?

Retaliation Must Be Viewed As Unacceptable Behavior:

Let me put it another way, suppose that each of the aircraft in the next 9/11 attack carries nuclear weapons. Would you want the next FBI agent or NSA employee with knowledge of the perpetrators and their plan to be afraid of losing their job if they were to go over the head of another supervisor to provide a timely warning? No matter how remotely possible, this situation demonstrates that even the threat of retaliation must be viewed as unacceptable behavior and that it is time for the leadership of the federal government in all three branches to set a new standard for ethical behavior by providing meaningful and real protections for whistleblowers.

The protections addressed in this proposal are to protect federal employees who make a lawful disclosure about some violation that is being perpetrated by another federal employee. These disclosures can be a vital source in the process of preventing or halting a wide variety of illegal activity -- within -- the government. Historically, the majority of disclosures made by whistleblowers have been the source of information that has, or could have, saved lives and/or reduced “gross” waste in federal spending.

For most, the typical “reward” is the removal from federal service, the accompanying loss of income, the devastation of the person’s family, and too frequently stress or depression induced suicide. Please don’t be mistaken in the belief that the continued patches to the federal personal system do anything to help the whistleblower. The truth is that these laws, rules, and regulations merely grant the whistleblower the opportunity to spend tens of thousands of dollars -- money they do not have -- to go to court and fight to get their job back in an office where the managers and other employees probably don’t want the whistleblower back. I would hope that you would agree that this is hardly the way to treat civil servants who could be the person who could to save your life or the life of a person you love.

Current Protections are Adverse to Effective Management:

While I am not suggesting that the act of whistleblowing should be grounds for termination from federal service, I have determined that whistleblowing is adverse to effective management. Partnered with other changes to the federal personnel system, the implementation of a system of income guarantees should abandon efforts to prohibit termination from employment as an act of retaliation. Furthermore, I think there are situations where the friction between an employee and management has reached the point where termination of employment is the best alternative for everyone involved and in some of these situations, management should at least be given the option of terminating a person’s federal service once their income guarantee has been determined and/or the guarantee meets some minimum criteria. Nevertheless, once the whistleblower’s income is protected, then the threat of financial retaliation is removed and the whistleblower would have the option of remaining on the job or leaving without the loss of income.

Having been a whistleblower and having watched many others go through the same process, it is my belief that in almost every case, it would be best if the whistleblower did not continue in their job and that finding alternate employment is the best solution for everyone. A system of guaranteeing the whistleblower’s income would permit this as a voluntary action on the part of the whistleblower and with rare exception this should be the normal procedure.

Establishing the Office of the Advocate General:

Another important part of this recommended course of action is the formation of the Office of the Advocate General (OAG), as an office within the Government Accountability Office (GAO). As the name implies, the OAG should be tasked to aggressively advocate the allegations of the whistleblower in much the same way as an attorney is tasked to represent their client. The OAG would be tasked to receive all allegations of improprieties, would be granted the authority to investigate all disclosures, have the capability to make the determination of the actual or assessed value of the disclosure, and would be designated as the administering office for the payment of the income guarantee.

In and out of government circles it is well accepted that GAO has the expertise to conduct this type of investigation and it would also place the administration of the program outside the Executive Branch thereby respecting the separation of powers. Accordingly, this office should be tasked as the primary agency to which allegations would be reported and it must be authorized to perform investigations to determine the value and authenticity of the allegations. In anticipation of Executive Branch objections, I would recommend that the OAG be authorized to make an immediate determination and grant the whistleblower an income guarantee to retirement if the agency and/or Executive Branch fails to cooperate with the OAG or restricts or prohibits the investigation in any manner. In addition to its investigative responsibilities, the OAG would also be the most likely organization to oversee the administrative tasks for managing the payments to the whistleblowers.

What to do with Recovered Funds:

One of the most difficult areas of concern has been to determine what happens to the money that is “saved” as a result of the actions of the whistleblower. For those who would compare the private sector economy to the government, the notion of saving money is acceptable. However, in reality, the federal government is in the business of spending money so our objective is the efficient spending and not necessarily “saving” money.

Depending on whether or not the funds can actually be recovered, what type of appropriation is involved, and the potential harmful impact on the affected program if the funds are redirected are variables that would effect the final disposition of affected funds. It is reasonably concluded that the best alternative is for the OAG to determine the amount of the savings, to have the amount of savings redirected immediately to the OAG from the offending Department’s or Agency’s funds immediately upon the issuance of an OAG report of its findings, and then to have the OAG incorporate into its report to Congress a recommendation for the final disposition of funds.

The final step would be in keeping with the Congressional oversight provisions of the Constitution enabling Congress to determine the final disposition of the savings even if that is a decision to return the funds to the program. Although this would imply an arduous process, this step could include an administrative procedure that would negate a case by case redirection. For example the standard procedure might be to deduct the operational costs of the OAG investigation from the offending organization’s funds and then based on legislative ceilings, would return funds to the agency or forward the matter to the appropriate committee for approval of the OAG recommended redirection.

No Priority on Prosecution:

When the whistleblower’s allegations are sustained, the emphasis of the proposed program is to provide the income protections to the whistleblower and to end the waste, fraud, abuse or other violations of law as quickly as possible. It is an important distinction that this program is not intended to assist in the collection of evidence that might assist in prosecution of acts of waste, fraud, abuse, improprieties, or other violations of law. Instead, it is the intent of these protections to provide for the means for the OAG to disclose the acts of waste, fraud, abuse, improprieties, or other violations of law as soon as possible with the intent to end them and/or to implement corrective actions as soon as possible.

Certainly it would be appropriate for the OAG to provide information to the Department of Justice (DoJ) for possible prosecution, but I do not believe that it would be prudent for the OAG to be subordinated to the DoJ such that an OAG investigation would be delayed because of an ongoing DoJ investigation. In this regard, I think that the priority of the Legislative Branch must be to disclose the improprieties as soon as possible and to couple the disclosure with the protection of the whistleblower’s income such that the prosecution of any alleged wrongdoer should be a secondary consideration.

That should not be interpreted as meaning that I want to see the alleged perpetrators go unpunished. However, I do believe that to be consistent with Court decisions, the employing branch of government must be responsible for determining the administrative remedy to be imposed. If the matter is a criminal violation of law, then it should be left to the DoJ to prosecute the offenders.

Penalty for Improper Disclosure:

Related to the same topic would be the abuses of the proposed system of protections that will bring out all sorts of allegations in the hope of obtaining a lifetime income. As a practical matter there are persons who will seek to get around or abuse just about any law that is placed on the books and this law will be no different. Of course there will be those who will report gross waste just because they heard something in the hallway. If the federal bureaucracy is as efficient as its overseers would have us believe, then there will only be a trickle of sustainable allegations. On the other hand, if it is as inefficient as its detractors represent, then large numbers of sustainable allegations will tumble into the in boxes of the OAG and that would also be a good thing.

This approach to whistleblower protections will serve to improve the quality of the federal workforce where those who would like to get a life-time income or who simple want to create a problem for their management by making a false or even a frivolous allegation will quickly find it necessary to seek a job elsewhere. I don’t believe it would be necessary to include any penalty provision other than to open the door to management to discharge the person. Of course, if the job of discharging the perpetrator of a false allegation were easier, then it might be concluded that more senior management might also deserve the opportunity to discharge the manager or persons responsible for the sustained violations as reported by the whistleblower.

Conclusion:

If the efficiency of federal spending is the outcome, then I certainly support this approach to protecting whistleblowers. I think it is an absolute disgrace and shame for this Nation through the actions and inactions of its elected leaders to encourage individuals to step forward with valuable information that could improve government operations only to see these folks and their families suffer financial collapse and financial ruin.

With a real system of protections, dysfunctional managers who seek to power-play their ideas into fruition will find their own staffs opting for a lifetime income and they will be doomed to failure. So, I see the federal bureaucratic process genuinely improving even if it means granting life-time incomes to federal employees who share the ideal of an efficiency of government.

As a Nation of concerned citizens, we can no longer tolerate even the threat of unacceptable behavior in the form of any kind of retaliation against the whistleblower. Similarly, it is unacceptable to offer after-the-fact protections that merely permit a person to fight for reinstatement to their job even with financial compensation if they are lucky enough to argue their case successfully. Governments are charged with the responsibility of protecting their citizens against enemies, foreign and domestic, and it is time that the federal government set the standard for ethical conduct by firmly guaranteeing the incomes of its employees should they find themselves in the position to report their allegations of waste, fraud, abuse or some other as yet to be defined category of public importance.

If you have questions or concerns about this proposal, would like more information, would like to work for the implementation of this proposal, or simply want to express your opinions, you may contact me.

Sincerely,

Thomas F. Day

PO Box 16495

Washington DC  20041

tfday@aol.com